Orientation 101
by chet ~ December 4th, 2007. Filed under: Boyd's Theories, Iraq.[Warning! This is a theory post. If you've had enough theory for one day, you're excused.]
I. It’s orientation, not speed
As I noted in an earlier post, several commentators have pointed out that the observe-then-orient-then-decide-then-act model doesn’t work very well. This has led people to question the relevance of the OODA loop, and by implication Boyd’s work in general, to modern conflict. If that were an accurate description of the “loop,” they would have a good point.
As early as the mid-80s, though, Boyd was moving away from the sequential concept and beginning to emphasize the role of orientation:
Orientation is the Schwerpunkt … Orientation shapes the character of present observation‑orientation‑decision-action loops-while these present loops shape the character of future orientation. (Organic Design, 16)
The second O, orientation-as the repository of our genetic heritage, cultural tradition, and previous experiences-is the most important part of the O‑O‑D‑A loop since it shapes the way we observe, the way we decide, the way we act. (Organic Design 26)
A decade later, Boyd had not only moved orientation to center stage, he had begun to identify it with the entire OODA “loop”:
Also note how the entire “loop” (not just orientation) is an ongoing many-sided implicit cross-referencing process of projection, empathy, correlation, and rejection. (The OODA “loop”sketch, from The Essence of Winning and Losing)
II. What is the US national orientation?
If orientation is that important, what do we make of a recent poll by the Pew Research Center that found that the US population is evenly divided on how the war is going? In other words, we seem to be split into two camps with mutually opposing orientations on a very important topic. These two viewpoints represent differences not only in orientations but also in the actions that would flow from them, i.e., our national policies.
III. Sounds bad, but what exactly is orientation?
It will help, at this point, to examine a little more on what orientation is. Here’s Boyd’s cut at it:
Orientation is a far-from-equilibrium interactive process of many-sided implicit cross-referencing projections, empathies, correlations, and rejections that is shaped by and shapes the interplay of genetic heritage, cultural tradition, previous experiences, unfolding circumstances, and the analyses we perform and the syntheses we create. (Organic Design 15, as amended by personal communication)
That really clears things up. Reminds me of the opening lines of Beowulf (”Hwæt! We Gardena in geardagum, þeodcyninga, þrym gefrunon, …” Both this and Boyd are technically in English, incidentally.)
There are a few nuggets to be mined, however. First thing to notice is that it’s not really a definition (Boyd didn’t claim that it was, by the way). It doesn’t say that orientation is the one and only such interactive process, nor does it say anything about the process itself other than list some of its ingredients and interactions.
IV. Can we find out what our orientation, or anybody’s, is?
Another point is that you can’t completely understand your own orientation in any explicit sense because any concept you have of your orientation is part of that orientation. It’s like the eye trying to see itself. The idea that there are such indefinable concepts goes way back:
The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao. (Opening lines of the Tao Te Ching, Mitchell trans.)
Boyd had read Alan Watts’ Tao, the Watercourse Way and was well aware of this.
What this means in practical terms is that if you try to make your orientation explicit - by, for example, listing all the elements in it or diagramming/modeling your own belief system - you will reach a point of diminishing returns.
But there are more fundamental limitations when we try to use a system to define itself:
One cannot determine the character or nature of a system within itself, and attempts to do so will generate confusion and disorder. (”Destruction and Creation” 13)
All of the Discourse (D&C, Patterns, Organic Design, etc.) is but an exegesis of this statement. In fact, the essence of Boyd’s strategy of conflict is to get the other side to do this to themselves, while improving your own ability to resist these effects.
V. So, what’s it good for?
Granting all this semi-mystical musing, is there any practical value in the concept? Depends on how you use it. Here are some points on orientation as it relates to the conduct of conflict:
- Orientation is dynamic. Like a whirlpool, it only exists if it is processing. Boyd often used this image, borrowing from the work of the late Ilya Prigogine. See Osinga for more on this. Things we can do to the other side, like generate confusion and disorder, can work on the dynamics of their orientation and make it less effective in triggering actions against us.
- It can be thought of as some sort of mental model, although that’s also a construct - people act as if they had a mental model inside their heads but nobody’s ever actually seen one. Still, there is an image of a dynamic external world and a dynamic internal simulacrum of that world, and our job is to keep the two in rough harmony, better than our opponents do, even though neither is completely knowable. It’s also nice to screw up the other side’s whenever we can.
- One way to approach it is as the opposite of “disorientation,” which has the connotation of a queasy feeling right on the verge of panic. So whatever the opposite of that is to you.
- Keep reminding yourself that what’s important in a conflict is operating inside the opponent’s OODA loop, not so much the OODA loop itself. This suggests that what we really want is for our orientations to generate useful actions at a rhythm or tempo that the other side cannot cope with - i.e., to disorient them. As always, we do whatever we can to keep the other side’s orientation from doing the same to us.
VI. We now return you to the war in progress.
If your conception of the situation is something like: “All the major parties are beginning to accept the advantage of decreasing the level of communal violence and cooperating with US forces to rebuild Iraq” then you probably see a long presence in the country to help them do it.
If, on the other hand, your assessment is more like: “The various militias, including the Iraqi army, are taking whatever they can get from us while they prepare for the big civil war to come” then you might favor an immediate drawdown of US forces or perhaps even a complete withdrawal.
We can live with this difference of opinion for a while. Given the uncertainty in the situation, some difference of opinion is healthy. But over time, and with an election coming up, differences of opinion can escalate into “many non-cooperative centers of gravity.” This is taking us out of mere uncertainty and over into the very nasty realm of ambiguity, competing impressions of events as they may - or may not - be. If it reaches this stage, we will have no national orientation worthy of the name and so no hope, other than dumb luck, of effective actions.
VII. It gets worse.
Ambiguity plus menace - lacking now, but where did all those “terrorists” we pushed out of Baghdad go? - and mistrust, a natural consequence of fragmenting into many non-cooperative centers of gravity, produce Boyd’s formula for national moral collapse. When this happened during the Vietnam War, we came back to our North American sanctuary and regrouped.
In fourth generation warfare, unfortunately, there are no sanctuaries.
December 5th, 2007 at 11:41 am
It struck me that Decision does not feed backward into Orientation.
Why is this? Or is this what “analysis /synthesis” is supposed to be?
December 5th, 2007 at 1:25 pm
tdaxp — Interesting question. I don’t have a definitive answer, but here are some thoughts:
1. Decision does feed into orientation through the feedback into observation (which in Boyd’s model is the only way anything gets into orientation)
2. Decision also affects orientation through the action block - two feeds there, the feedback into observation and the unfolding interaction link.
3. The block labeled “Decision” has to be something other than “implicit guidance and control.” So in a sense, we’re only talking about explicit decision (written orders, for example). Because Boyd repeatedly emphasized implicit over explicit, though, one has to wonder exactly what this block represents and how it is / should be used.
4. Note the word “hypothesis” in parens. This is why I suggested the decision block as part of the learning, rather than the operating, process (to the extent the two can be separated.) The idea is behavioral: You try (hypothesize then test) something and whatever happens–positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement, or nothing–enters orientation. Boyd had read Skinner and was familiar with behavioral psychology. Obviously this also ties into scientific research - Conceptual Spiral [411 KB PDF on DNI] type stuff.
5. Boyd also emphasized that there are times that you need explicit decisions: nuclear weapons, money, lack of trust. In actual fact, though, such an explicit decision would appear to be inseparable from action - how you promulgate it is as important as the decision itself (example in the book Certain to Win on p. 134.) Explicit decisions are slow and more subject to misinterpretation than a properly executed implicit scheme.
Hope this helped.
December 5th, 2007 at 7:14 pm
Sent to me by Dag von Lubitz, Ph.D., M.D. and Chairman of the Board of MedSmart:
I cannot help wondering who the people trying to play with the Loop really are. Maybe it is my scientific past, maybe the history of driving a minesweeper through a rotten jetty, or maybe my irascible skipper who once told me to get my orbs out of my arse or the marks of his sea boot on the latter would create new spectacles for the former, but it really is rather obvious that the orientation bit is the critical, and everything else is the result of that step – in many ways it is, indeed, the speed limiter, and the one who does that trick better will, by definition, shorten everything else.
The sequentiality of the entire thing is an intellectual shortcut helping the less imaginative see the connections: a good commander/leader realizes these things in an almost simultaneous move. Boris surely will see this as a fighter pilot. In short: is the fact that people have unidimensional imagination and mono-rail education the determinant of their inability to perceive the environment as multidimensional? If so, Lord help us, because we are really doomed in the world that just got a little more complex!
December 6th, 2007 at 4:16 am
[...] of the OODA loop see this; for a discussion of Orientation see Chet Richard’s new blog post. Who can tell what has caused this social illness, a form of cultural Alzheimer’s? The [...]